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Impressions of Orthodoxy in Turkey: 
Secularization, Politics, Arts, 
and Tourism
Gitta Hammarberg
Since 1991, His All Holiness Bartholomew I, Archbishop of Con-
stantinople, New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch, the 270th successor 
to Christ’s apostle St. Andrew, presides over the Ecumenical Patriarch-
ate in Constantinople. The Patriarchate has existed uninterruptedly 
since the fourth century A.D., even when Byzantine Constantinople 
fell to the Muslim Turks in 1453. It has been a “church in captivity” 
for over 500 years, continuing even today in a secular Turkish state. 
The Patriarch leads over 300 million Orthodox Christians, the world’s 
oldest and second largest Christian community.1 The Muslim major-
ity religion, approximately 99% of the population, is overseen by the 
government’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). The non-Mus-
lim religions, including about seventy Greek Orthodox sites (with a 
dwindling population variously estimated at 2000–5000 members) and 
around fifty Armenian Orthodox sites (with 65,000 members) are regu-
lated by a different government agency, the General Directorate for 
Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu). The Orthodox sites, together 
with circa twenty Jewish sites (with 25,000 members), have special 
legal minority status, as dictated by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.2 As Ecu-
menical, the Patriarch is recognized by autocephalous and autonomous 
Orthodox churches internationally as the primus inter pares of bishops. 
The Turkish government, however, does not formally recognize the 
ecumenical authority of the Patriarch, only his authority over the coun-
try’s Greek Orthodox community. What Steven Runciman said in 1971 
about Patriarch Athenagoras (1948–72) holds equally true of the pres-
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ent Patriarch: his relations with the Turkish secular state are “delicate 
and difficult” and the Turkish government “would prefer him not to 
be there at all.”3
Though the Turkish constitution mandates freedom of religion and 
the government in recent years has shown some tolerance of religion, 
there are nevertheless undue restrictions on religious groups and 
expression. The government regulates church property, it can close 
religious seminaries, grant cultural heritage status to sacred sites, pro-
hibit the building of places of worship, and so on. To a non-expert 
observer, the boundaries between religious and secular life in Turkey 
seem fluid. The Patriarch’s status as religious leader seems ambiguous, 
and his religious functions seem to blend seamlessly into more secular 
ones. Though the ecumenical status of Patriarch Bartholomew is not 
officially recognized, there seems, however, to be a tacit recognition of 
this status, which, for instance, allows him to travel widely and per-
form ecumenical activities.4
Patriarch Bartholomew has been particularly active in ecumenical 
outreach. He has promoted peace and interfaith cooperation, served 
as president of the World Council of Churches, and joined Pope John 
Paul II in attempts to reconcile the Orthodox and Catholic churches. 
He has met with the World Jewish Congress, traveled extensively in 
Muslim countries, and visited Georgia and Armenia. His trip to Cuba 
in 2004 was the first visit by an Ecumenical Patriarch to Latin America. 
He has also organized interfaith conferences and addressed environ-
mental issues in the Black Sea, the Danube basin, the Adriatic and 
Baltic Seas—a special interest that has made him known as the “Green 
Patriarch” and garnered him awards such as Norway’s Sophie Prize 
for linking faith to environmental issues.5 In addition, Patriarch Bar-
tholomew promotes Byzantine culture. He is, for instance, one of the 
primary supporters of Byzantine art exhibitions held at the Metro-
politan Museum in New York, including the current “Byzantium: Faith 
and Power (1261–1557).” His “Statement” in Greek and English opens 
the magnificent exhibition catalogue. He visited the exhibition and 
gave a lecture, “Byzantine Icons: A Legacy of Humanism,” on March 
18, 2004.6 His “religious” leadership thus includes “secular” environ-
mental and artistic issues.
Patriarch Bartholomew’s local authority as Archbishop of Constan-
tinople, recognized by the government, extends most directly over 
small Greek Orthodox communities in Turkey as well as some com-
munities in the Greek islands and Northern Greece—modest remains 
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of a once glorious Byzantine empire. Minority religions have not had 
an easy time in an overwhelmingly Muslim and now secular state. 
The list of human rights violations is long and includes acts of ethnic 
cleansing, pogroms, forced expulsions, acts of terrorism, vandalism, 
and even restrictions on the theological functioning of the Orthodox 
church.7 The size of the Orthodox community in today’s Turkey is 
negligible: “The Greek community in Turkey is dwindling, elderly 
and frightened. Its population has declined from about 110,000 at the 
time of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 to about 2,500 today 
[1991].”8 Documenting the state of the Greek congregations in Istanbul, 
Anastasia Stanmeyer cites George Jahos, a caretaker at a small church 
in downtown Istanbul: only nine people attend Sunday services. Jahos 
feels that Orthodox congregations in Turkey “are finished.” My own 
visit to several Greek Orthodox churches in the vicinity of the Patri-
archate in June 2004 (in the company of a Turkish-speaking Macalester 
College student, Basak Candar) bore out this pessimistic view. We 
visited the 13th-century Church of St. Mary of the Mongols, which, 
according to the Eyewitness Travel Guide to Istanbul, “is the only Greek 
Orthodox church in Istanbul to have remained continuously in the 
hands of the Greek community since the Byzantine era.” It was never 
converted to a mosque nor put to other uses and still contains a rich 
array of ancient icons and an especially beautiful Byzantine mosaic of 
the Theotokos Pammakristos.9 The caretaker told us that services are 
held only once a month and that no more than fifteen persons on the 
average attend, all of them elderly. According to Douglas Frantz, “the 
population of ethnic Greeks, with an average age of sixty, has been 
whittled from 15,000 to about 2,500 over a century of expulsions, attri-
tion and migration.”10 This situation threatens the continued opera-
tion of the church and many churches have reverted to the state when 
the community has decreased to less than ten people. An Armenian 
Orthodox church in Kirikhan, Hatay province, for instance, had to be 
turned over to an Armenian Orthodox Church Board after a complex 
court case.11 The Orthodox sites of worship are not only endangered in 
a spiritual sense, but also badly in need of upkeep and staffing. Andre 
Gerolymatos, assessing the year 2003–04, accuses the Turkish state of 
wishing to eliminate all traces of Byzantium:
Churches, monasteries, neo-classical houses and public buildings that 
represented the Greeks and hence Turkey’s European heritage has [sic] 
been destroyed or simply allowed to decay. Even Saint Sophia, one of 
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the greatest Churches and architectural monuments of the Greco-Roman 
period has languished as a museum relic rather than be permitted to 
function as a church. Why? The inescapable conclusion is that any refer-
ence to Hellenic civilization or Christianity is offensive to the Turkish 
state. Otherwise the Ecumenical Patriarchate would not need to secure 
an official permit in order to paint a wall or fix a church bell.12
Even at the Patriarchate itself, the 18th-century Church of St. George 
was open during our visit, but no guide was available at midday on a 
Saturday, despite the published 9:00–5:00 “daily” schedule. Two care-
takers were in the process of dusting the church and allowed us to look 
at the rich icons, the Byzantine-era Patriarch’s throne, an ornate ico-
nostasis, and other unique treasures housed there. The Church of the 
Pammakaristos housed the Patriarchate from the time of the Ottoman 
conquest until it was converted into a mosque in the 16th century. A 
side chapel with Byzantine mosaics operates as a museum and is sup-
posedly open during prayer hours. We gained access into the court-
yard with the help of neighborhood children, which at least gave us 
a glimpse of the outside of the church and the remnants of Byzantine 
marble friezes displayed on the lawn. Other churches are also acces-
sible only by ringing the doorbell on the gate to alert the caretakers, 
which is not always successful. We managed to rouse the caretaker of 
another small Church of St. George in the neighborhood, but it was 
clear that visitors were hardly expected and that services were held 
sporadically at best. Although this church, too, contains ancient icons 
(especially fine ones of its patron saint), the caretaker could offer us 
no relevant information and we were struck by the incongruously 
garish blue paint that had recently been applied to the interior walls.13 
The 12th-century Church of the Pantocrator, now a mosque, was simi-
larly desolate. Despite being featured prominently in guidebooks and 
advertised as potentially accessible outside prayer hours, we had no 
luck. All these churches are located in the vicinity of the current Patri-
archate, a once thriving Greek and Jewish community, now in urgent 
need of urban renewal. The Jews and Greeks have apparently been 
succeeded by extremist Islamists, judging by the profusion of their 
election posters and banners as well as covered women, including very 
young girls. The locals had no knowledge of the Orthodox churches.
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Part of the reason for the difficulty in sustaining Turkish Orthodox 
congregations is the scarcity of trained clergy, especially acute after the 
closing of both Greek and Armenian theological seminaries in 1971, 
when the state nationalized private institutions of higher learning. The 
figures for Armenian Orthodox priests are indicative: 43 churches and 
16 communities without a church are served by a total of 18 ordained 
priests. Forty to fifty additional priests are sorely needed.14 According 
to Frantz, “fewer than half of Turkey’s Greek Orthodox churches are 
open, in part because of a shortage of priests.”15 Patriarch Bartholomew 
has energetically tried to convince the government that the Halki semi-
nary, founded in 1844, with room for 80–120 seminarians, should be 
reopened. After an intense international campaign and after the Patri-
arch’s meetings with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and Prime Minis-
ter Recep Tayyip Erdogan in August 2003, the prospects for reopening 
finally seem quite good. “The ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) appears to be looking favorably upon the request,” according to 
the Patriarch, and “we are waiting with certainty. A political solution to 
this is very simple, and it should come very soon.”16 The Patriarch has 
expressed openness to “reasonable government controls.” In an inter-
view with George Gilson, the Patriarch states:
We want the school to operate again as it did until 1971. Since it will 
operate on Turkish soil, there will be some supervision from the [Turk-
ish] education ministry. This does not disturb us in the least, because we 
have nothing to hide. The school used to be run in a manner that was 
transparent, far from politics and under the umbrella, protection and 
financial support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate…Turkey will benefit 
from the reopening of such a school, because it will demonstrate to the 
whole world that there is indeed freedom of religion. It will show that 
minority rights are respected.17
The opening of the seminary has become a political football between 
Turkey and Greece on questions of expanding minority rights on both 
sides. This could help the Patriarch’s cause. One of the several peti-
tions for reopening the seminary, for example, notes that, “in 1937, 
the mayor of Thessaloniki, Greece, donated the house that Mustapha 
Kemal was born in to the Turkish government. The Turkish govern-
ment should make a similar gesture and should allow the Theologi-
cal School of Halki to open.”18 Turkey’s bid for European Union (EU) 
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membership will no doubt support the seminary opening, as the Patri-
arch himself likes to stress. Gerylomatos argues convincingly that Tur-
key could have a “magnificent historical and cultural mechanism” for 
claiming “Europeanness” and thus strengthen its case for EU inclu-
sion. It would only have to claim its status as the inheritor of Byzantine 
culture, allow the Orthodox church to flourish freely and support the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, allow Hagia Sophia to function as a church, 
remove its forces from Cyprus, and negotiate a compromise of the fate 
of the Turkish Cypriots.19 The Turkish Daily News of June 8, 2004 cites 
an NTV report on Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Greece in May: 
“Authorities have sped up the work to reopen the theological school in 
Heybeliada Island off Istanbul and the Foreign ministry has requested 
relevant authorities to submit their assessments on the issue.” Erdogan 
made the point that the government is considering the issue, though 
the Foreign ministry “declined to elaborate.” According to the same 
NTV report, “the reopening of the seminary required legal changes 
that would allow the seminary to have an independent structure, not 
linked to any theological faculty.”20 Religious issues have a way of 
entering international politics even in secular states.
Another obstacle to hiring Orthodox priests is that Orthodox clergy 
in Turkey are required to hold Turkish citizenship, with a very few 
exceptions.21 This has also been addressed by Patriarch Bartholomew, 
himself an ethnic Greek with Turkish citizenship. This year he took the 
radical step of appointing non-Turkish clerics to half of the twelve seats 
on the Holy Synod, the council governing the church, to reflect its ecu-
menical reach. The appointments include citizens of the United States, 
Great Britain, Greece, New Zealand, and Finland. Contradictory state-
ments regarding these appointments, however, provide another reflec-
tion of the Patriarchate’s ambivalent relationship to the state. While 
a church official maintained that the government had accepted the 
Patriarchate’s notification of the appointments, a government official 
denied that permission for the Patriarchate to make such appointments 
had been granted.22 However, international politics should strengthen 
the Patriarchate’s power over religious matters. Foreign support, espe-
cially from the American Archdiocese, has been voiced for the appoint-
ments, and pressure from the EU also favors the Patriarch’s right to 
make such appointments. These concrete examples seem to indicate 
that though the local Orthodox communities in Turkey face a precari-
ous diminution, there is some hope for a brighter future. Specifically, 
property rights of churches are being addressed, proper training of 
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Orthodox priests is likely to improve, and the ecumenical scope of the 
Patriarchate is enhanced by an internationalized Holy Synod.
Another aspect of the secularization of Orthodoxy became a point of 
contention in connection with Turkey’s plans to commemorate Christi-
anity in the year 2000. Theodore G. Karakostas, for instance, expressed 
dismay at the commercial exploitation of Orthodox places of worship 
in converting Byzantine churches to mosques and/or museums while 
repressing Orthodoxy. “For Turkey to use Christian sites for commer-
cial purposes after eliminating the Christians who once upheld those 
sites is IMMORAL and OBSCENE!,” Karakostas exclaims, feeling that 
Turkey has no claim to the Byzantine heritage after first destroying 
Byzantium and continuing to destroy the last vestiges of Byzantine 
culture.23 One can sympathize with these sentiments from a religious 
point of view, though one could equally well argue, along with Ger-
olymatos, that restoring and displaying churches and Byzantine art 
for tourists in a secular way is preferable to the ultimate erasure that 
otherwise seems inevitable. A functioning Hagia Sophia might, as Ger-
olymatos puts it, provide a “boost in tourism as millions of Orthodox 
Christians would flock to Constantinople.”24 Byzantine culture rep-
resents a rich artistic heritage that deserves to be seen, even by non-
believers. The Patriarch himself, as we have seen, supports artistic 
displays of Orthodoxy.
One prime example of “commercialization” is the Church of St. Sav-
ior in Chora, included in virtually all city tours of Istanbul and filled 
with visitors at all times. This was certainly the case during my two 
visits to the church in August 1999 and again in May 2004, when the 
church-museum was filled with Orthodox nuns and other believers as 
well as non-believers. The ancient monastery complex within which 
the current church is situated has undergone numerous changes, due 
to earthquakes, crusades, iconoclasts, and the Ottoman conquest of 
Constantinople. The church seen today dates from the 11th century, 
with significant remodeling and artistic adornment added in the early 
14th century. After the Ottoman conquest it was converted to a mosque 
without significant architectural changes besides the addition of a 
minaret and the whitewashing of the interior art. A good example of 
artistic-religious hybridity, it was characteristically referred to as “The 
Church Mosque.”25 In 1848–58, it was restored to its present condi-
tion by the American Byzantine Institute, and turned into an attractive 
museum. The guidebooks today contain obsessively detailed explana-
tions of each fresco and mosaic and their Biblical subtexts—clearly 
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directed at tourists entirely unfamiliar with the Bible.26 The careful res-
toration and conversion to a museum have made this precious example 
of Byzantine culture open for all to appreciate.
*****
Though the cycle of conversion, destruction, deterioration, rebuilding, 
and redecorating of churches seldom ends up as successfully as in this 
church, layers of an interesting hybrid past are characteristic of most 
churches in regions settled by successive population waves. One such 
region of Turkey is Cappadocia, which is a prime spot for tourism. It 
boasts some officially designated “World Heritage Sites” (e.g., Göreme 
Open-Air Museum), several museums, and numerous facilities and 
festivals for tourists. Its main attractions include amazing volcanic 
rock formations, Byzantine churches hewn in rock, and multi-storied 
underground cities.27 The Christian heritage of the region is one of its 
main attractions, and the Byzantine rock churches are a major part of 
any tour, their number estimated at between 400 and 1,000.28 They date 
from the 6th through the 12th centuries and, though many structures 
and much of the material has been “recycled” by successive popula-
tions or destroyed by nature, these churches provide unique evidence 
of a flourishing early Christian culture. Cappadocia was a major Chris-
tian site and is intimately linked to important figures. For example, 
three Orthodox Church fathers lived and worked there: Gregory of 
Naziansus, Gregory of Nyssa, and St. Basil the Great. They are amply 
featured in tourist brochures. Most of the churches are open to the 
public free of charge or at nominal fees. Most of them are also virtually 
unprotected and therefore prey to natural disintegration, vandalism, 
graffiti, and camera flashes. Only a small portion of them have been 
restored (and hence charge entrance fees), especially those located in 
open-air museums, such as that in Göreme. Indeed, the Turkish Min-
istry of Culture and Tourism promotes the Nevsehir region for “Faith 
Tourism” and of the 24 sites mentioned on one of its web pages, 20 are 
Byzantine churches and monasteries.29
Many of the Cappadocian sites vividly represent religious hybrid-
ity. For instance, one of the old cave towns in the Zelve valley features 
a church supplied with a rock-carved minaret, still standing close to a 
monastery where Christians hid from iconoclastic persecution. Virtu-
ally all of its frescoes and walls are covered with centuries of multicul-
tural, multi-religious graffiti. Roadside stands offer tourists the most 
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peculiar trinkets, combining religious images and secular elements. 
One example is a small wall decoration of a Byzantine iconic cloth rep-
resentation of the Virgin Eleousa, framed in metalwork incorporating 
three “evil eyes.”30 Equally incongruous are glass-enclosed icons con-
taining prayer tokens with money folded to show the face of Ataturk, 
found in the small church of St. George in Fener.
Most of the Cappadocian rock churches are small, only partially 
preserved, and unsuitable as sites for modern worship. Some churches 
are still in use, however. Our visit to Mustafapasa (in Ürgüp town, 
Nevsehir province) came just after the Third Sinasos Culture and Art 
Festival, celebrated at the end of May. As part of the festival, Patriarch 
Bartholomew led a religious service in the Church of Constantine and 
Helen, with several other Orthodox prelates present. Flower decora-
tions, quite dried up, still adorned the central pillars during our visit in 
June—perhaps an indication that locals want to extend the Patriarch’s 
presence. We met a devout Armenian Orthodox believer, Alex Kara-
kulakyan, owner of the Prokopi Restaurant in Ürgüp, who proudly 
showed us a photograph in which he stood next to the Patriarch at the 
celebration and who himself demonstratively wore a large silver cross. 
Prokopi perpetuates Armenian culture in its fabulous menu.
Religious practice in the towns and villages of this region, though 
difficult for lack of working churches and clergy, is clearly reinvig-
orated by visits by Orthodox clergy. The Anadolu News Agency’s 
account of the event emphasized the Patriarch’s visit as a cultural mis-
sion. It quoted him as saying that he “sincerely believed that Turkey 
would join the European Union” and that Turkey already deserves 
EU membership “thanks to its cultural heritage and mission.” He also 
thanked “Turkish officials for their support to Orthodox people to per-
form their religious practices in the churches around Anatolia which 
had been closed for 80 years.”31 Again, secular concerns seamlessly 
blend into religious ones.
To conclude, to an outside observer it seems that the ecumenical 
powers of the Patriarch are increasingly recognized by the Turkish 
government. Within Turkey, Orthodoxy shows signs of reinvigora-
tion even as its adherents are decreasing in numbers and most of its 
churches falling into disrepair and neglect. Paradoxically perhaps, the 
Orthodox religion is given a boost through political aspirations (such 
as EU membership), by cultural events (such as the Arts Festival in 
Nevsehir or the exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum), and through 
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“museification” and tourism. Secular activities promote the religious 
practice and visibility of Turkish minorities. •
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